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While the U. S. Supreme Court long ago recognized that
individuals do not lose their free speech rights simply by virtue
of being state employees,1 the contours of those protections have
been evolving over the past several decades. The proper way to
apply these protections in the academic context is confusing,
especially after Garcetti v. Ceballos in which the Court suggested
that First Amendment protections do not attach insofar as
individuals are speaking as employees rather than as citizens.2 The
circuit courts have adopted a dizzying set of rules to determine
when First Amendment protections are triggered in the
academic context, some distinguishing between the protections
afforded to college professors and the protections afforded to
primary and secondary school teachers3 and others distinguishing
based on whether the expression is appropriately characterized
as teaching, scholarship, or instead, something else.4 Still others
offer a different approach.5 Even when the Garcetti exception is
not triggered, the circuits offer very different interpretations of
how to apply the prevailing jurisprudence. Until the Court offers
greater guidance, we can only expect the circuits to continue to
† Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
1 Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2374 (2014) (“Almost 50 years ago, this
Court declared that citizens do not surrender their First Amendment rights by accepting
public employment.”).
2 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
3 See infra notes 202–207 and accompanying text (distinguishing between
First Amendment rights of college professors and those of individuals teaching in
primary and secondary schools).
4 See infra notes 249–250 and accompanying text (distinguishing between
speech related to professional work and speech offered as an ordinary citizen on matters
of public concern).
5 See infra notes 238–267 and accompanying text (discussing whether
legitimate goals like fundraising and maintaining workplace efficiency will immunize
university actions under Pickering).
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treat relevantly similar cases differently and to diverge with
respect to what academic freedom includes.
Part I of this article discusses the Pickering-Garcetti line
of cases, noting that even if theGarcetti exception does not apply
when teaching and research are at issue, the Pickering v. Board
of Education decision is so open-ended with respect to the proper
analysis that it almost guarantees confusion in the circuits when
academic freedom is at issue. Part II discusses the application of
the prevailing jurisprudence in the context of public education,
highlighting some of the ways in which the circuit analyses are at
odds. The article concludes that the Court not only must make
clear that Garcetti does not apply in the context of teaching and
research, but also must make clear that the Pickering analysis
must be understood differently in the academic context to
preserve the constitutional values embodied in academic freedom.
I. PICKERING AND ITS PROGENY
The Supreme Court provided the seminal test for
determining when state employees’ First Amendment rights can
be overridden in Pickering v. Board of Education.6 There, the
Court discussed various considerations that must be balanced,
and a series of subsequent cases attempted to address some of
the questions that Pickering did not resolve. For example, the
Court did not discuss whether the holding might have been
different had the state employee’s comments affected his working
relationship with his colleagues. Nor did the Court discuss the
degree to which workplace efficiency must be sacrificed as a cost
of protecting First Amendment values. Regrettably, the
clarifications offered in the later cases have made the
jurisprudence more confusing rather than less, leaving the
circuits with an increasingly muddled jurisprudence to apply.
A. Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High
School District 205
Marvin Pickering, a high school teacher,7 wrote a letter
to the editor appearing in the local newspaper after a school levy
was defeated at the polls.8 Prior to the vote, a few articles had
6 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty. Ill., 391
U.S. 563 (1968).
7 Id. at 564.
8 Id. at 566 (“[O]n September 19, 1964, a second proposal to increase the tax
rate was submitted by the Board and was likewise defeated. It was in connection with
this last proposal of the School Board that appellant wrote the letter to the editor . . . that
resulted in his dismissal.”).
2018] PICKERING, GARCETTI, & ACADEMIC FREEDOM 581
appeared in the newspaper asserting that the failure to pass the
requested tax increase would result in a decline in the quality of
education provided to the students.9 Pickering wanted to
respond to those articles.10
Pickering made a few controversial allegations in that
published piece. Not only did he suggest that the Board of
Education had wrongly prioritized athletics over academics,11
but he further claimed that the superintendent had tried to
prevent teachers from expressing their lack of support for the
tax increase.12 Pickering’s letter did not go unnoticed and he was
fired for having expressed those views.13 The Supreme Court of
Illinois upheld the dismissal.14 Pickering appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court.15
The Court began its analysis by noting that it has
“unequivocally rejected”16 the view that “teachers may
constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on
matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the
public schools in which they work.”17 The Constitution strikes a
balance, the Court noted, “between the interests of the teacher,
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.”18 Needless to say, promoting efficiency in an
academic context might be thought to cover a variety of
institutional interests ranging from “maintaining control over
the academic processes”19 to “promot[ing] the efficiency of its
9 Id. (“These articles urged passage of the tax increase and stated that failure
to pass the increase would result in a decline in the quality of education afforded children
in the district’s schools.”).
10 Id. (“It was in response to the foregoing material, together with the failure
of the tax increase to pass, that appellant submitted the letter in question to the editor
of the local paper.”).
11 Id. (“The letter constituted, basically, an attack on the School Board’s
handling of the 1961 bond issue proposals and its subsequent allocation of financial
resources between the schools’ educational and athletic programs.”).
12 Id. at 566 (“It also charged the superintendent of schools with attempting to
prevent teachers in the district from opposing or criticizing the proposed bond issue.”).
13 Id. (“The Board dismissed Pickering for writing and publishing the letter.”).
14 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill.,
225 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1967), rev’d, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
15 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 565 (noting “appellant’s claim that the Illinois statute
permitting his dismissal on the facts of this case was unconstitutional as applied under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments”).
16 Id. at 568.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 David M. Dumas, Caroline McIntyre & Katheryne L. Zelenock, Comment,
Parate v. Isibor: Resolving the Conflict Between the Academic Freedom of the University
and the Academic Freedom of University Professors, 16 J.C. & U.L. 713, 719 (1990).
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services”20 to requiring employees to have the ability to be
collegial with coworkers.21
When assessing whether Pickering’s comments might
impair school efficiency, the Court noted that the “statements
are in no way directed towards any person with whom appellant
would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work as a
teacher.”22 The Court did not discuss what would have happened if
Pickering’s comments were viewed as reflecting an unwillingness
to be a “team player,”23 which might have contributed to less-than-
collegial relations among employees or between Pickering and his
immediate supervisor.24 In Pickering, there was no evidence that
the comments led to a deterioration of relations, if only because
most coworkers seemed not to care about the comments.25 But
precisely because the comments seemed to do no harm,
upholding First Amendment rights in this case might have little
import in a different case where the expression undermined
workplace efficiency.
The Court clearly wanted to prevent public employees
from being coerced into silence, noting that “the threat of
dismissal from public employment is . . . a potent means of
inhibiting speech.”26 Pickering can be read to provide robust
protection to the right of public employees to contribute to
debates about matters of public concern.27 But it can also be read
to afford much less protection than first appears because First
Amendment rights can be overridden upon a showing that public
comments have impaired working relationships. Several
20 E. Edmund Reutter Jr., Naragon v. Wharton: Tip of an Iceberg?, 21 EDUC.
L. REP. 1103, 1106 (1985).
21 Cf. Mary Ann Connell, Kerry Brian Melear & Frederick G. Savage,
Collegiality in Higher Education Employment Decisions: The Evolving Law, 37 J.C. &
U.L. 529, 538–39 (2011) (discussing “the federal appellate courts confirming the
legitimacy of considering collegiality in a tenure denial situation”).
22 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569–70.
23 Cf. Carol A. Parker, Tenure Advice for Law Librarians and Their Directors,
103 LAW LIBR. J. 199, 206–09 (2011) (discussing the importance of being a team player
for those seeking tenure).
24 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570 (“Thus no question of maintaining either discipline
by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers is presented here.”).
25 Id. (“Pickering’s letter was greeted by everyone but its main target, the
Board, with massive apathy and total disbelief.”).
26 Id. at 574.
27 Mark Strasser, Whistleblowing, Public Employees, and the First
Amendment, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 975, 980 (2013) (“Pickering . . . offer[s] robust
protection for state employees exercising their First Amendment rights.”); Tyler Wiese,
Seeing Through the Smoke: “Official Duties” in the Wake of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 25
A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 509, 529 (2010) (“The Court’s emphasis on protection of speech
for public employees perhaps reached its zenith in Pickering, in which the Court
articulated a robust test to ensure protection.”).
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subsequent cases explored the degree to which First Amendment
rights outweigh the interest in workplace efficiency.
B. Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District
Pickering made very public statements by publishing a
letter to the editor in the local newspaper. Suppose, however,
that he had addressed matters of public concern in private
conversations. Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School
District addressed whether conversations made in private may
nonetheless implicate First Amendment protections.28
Bessie Givhan’s teaching contract was not renewed29
after she had a series of one-on-one conversations with her
principal about whether the school’s hiring practices involved
racial discrimination.30 The principal objected to the manner in
which Givhan’s comments were delivered, describing them as
“‘insulting,’ ‘hostile,’ ‘loud,’ and ‘arrogant.’”31 At issue before the
Supreme Court was whether such private conversations might
trigger First Amendment protections.32 After holding that
statements need not be public to trigger applicable guarantees,
the Court remanded the case for a determination of whether
Givhan would have been rehired but for her criticism.33
Givhan is protective of public employees’ speech in that
First Amendment guarantees may be triggered even when the
statements at issue are not made publicly. Here, too, however,
the standard may be less protective than first appears. The
principal claimed that there had been numerous occasions on
which Givhan had been less than pleasant when speaking to
him.34 Had there been less emphasis on Givhan allegedly having
offered unreasonable suggestions that the Court found were not
unreasonable35 and more emphasis on how Givhan had allegedly
made it difficult if not impossible “for a reasonable working
28 Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
29 Id. at 411.
30 See id. at 413.
31 Id. at 412.
32 Id. at 415–16 (“The First Amendment forbids abridgment of the ‘freedom of
speech.’ Neither the Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that this freedom is lost
to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather
than to spread his views before the public.”).
33 See id. at 417.
34 See Ayers v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 555 F.2d 1309, 1312 (5th Cir. 1977),
vacated in part sub nom., Givhan 439 U.S. 410 (“[O]n many occasions she has taken an
insulting and hostile attitude towards me and other administrators. She hampers my
job greatly by making petty and unreasonable demands. She is overly critical for a
reasonable working relationship to exist between us.”).
35 See Givhan, 439 U.S. at 412–13 (“[T]hose demands ‘were neither “petty” nor
“unreasonable”’”).
584 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:2
relationship to exist,”36 the trier of fact might have been induced
to believe that Givhan was not rehired for reasons of efficiency.37
This suggests that the applicable jurisprudence might be much
less protective depending upon the framing of the reasons for
dismissal,38 same underlying facts notwithstanding.
C. Connick v. Myers
An important aspect of both Pickering and Givhan was
that the expressions at issue involved matters of public concern.
Connick v. Myers39 illustrates the importance of the requirement
that the challenged expression be a matter of public concern
rather than of mere private interest.40
Myers, an assistant district attorney in New Orleans,
distributed a questionnaire to her coworkers “soliciting the
views of her fellow staff members concerning office transfer
policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the
level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt
pressured to work in political campaigns.”41 She did this after
being informed that she was going to be transferred to another
office.42 The Court characterized the contents of the questionnaire
as predominantly involving matters of mere private interest
rather than issues of public concern.43 Discussions of private
matters do not trigger First Amendment protections. “When
employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to
anymatter of political, social, or other concern to the community,
government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing
36 See Ayers, 555 F.2d at 1312.
37 Cf. Strasser, supra note 27, at 984 (“It would not have been difficult for a
district court to have found that the relationship had been too impaired to warrant
reinstatement.”).
38 Cf. Janelle L. Davis, Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones, But Names
Could Get Me a Mistrial: An Examination of Name-Calling in Closing Argument in Civil
Cases, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 133, 136 (2007) (quoting Rosemary Nidiry, Restraining Adversarial
Excess in Closing Argument, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1306 (1996)) (“The closing argument is
the advocate’s primary opportunity to ‘frame[ ] the evidence to support her “theory” of the
case, presenting the explanation for the facts that most strongly helps [her side] or hurts [the
other side].’”); Patricia M. Wald, Judge Arnold and Individual Rights, 78 MINN. L. REV. 35, 37
(1993) (“Without astute counsel, plaintiffs cannot possibly know how to frame their claims.”).
39 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
40 Sarah L. Fabian, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Whether an Employee Speaks as a
Citizen or as a Public Employee—Who Decides?, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1675, 1684 (2010)
(“Connick underscored the need to distinguish between speech on matters of public
concern and speech on matters of private concern.”).
41 Connick, 461 U.S. at 141.
42 Id. at 140–41 (“Myers was notified that she was being transferred.”).
43 Id. at 148 (“[W]ith but one exception, the questions posed by Myers to her
co-workers do not fall under the rubric of matters of ‘public concern.’”).
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their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the
name of the First Amendment.”44
Regrettably, the Court offered contradictory messages
with respect to the proper categorization of the relevant speech.
In one part of the opinion, the Court implied that the contents of
the questionnaire were purely of private interest. “We do not
suggest, however, that Myers’ speech, even if not touching upon a
matter of public concern, is totally beyond the protection of the
First Amendment.”45 But the Court later suggested in its decision
that most but not all of the questionnaire’s contents were merely
of private concern. “In this case, with but one exception, the
questions posed by Myers to her coworkers do not fall under the
rubric of matters of ‘public concern.’”46 Most of the questions
involved personnel issues47 and “internal office policy,”48 the one
exception being a question asking “whether assistant district
attorneys are pressured to work in political campaigns.”49
If one of the survey questions implicated a matter of
public concern, then it should be of interest whether that
question played an important role in the firing. The Court noted
that “Connick particularly objected . . . to a question concerning
pressure to work in political campaigns which he felt would be
damaging if discovered by the press.”50 But if the expression
involving a matter of public concern was thought particularly
objectionable, it seems reasonable to believe that this expression
in particular played a role in the firing. Would Myers have been
fired anyway? That might have been the question on remand.51
The Connick Court noted the lack of evidence that the
distribution of the questionnaire had made it difficult for Myers
to perform her job.52 One might have thought that this lack of
evidence would have been all that Myers needed to vindicate her
44 Id. at 146.
45 Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
46 Id. at 148.
47 Id. (“We view the questions pertaining to the confidence and trust that
Myers’ co-workers possess in various supervisors, the level of office morale, and the need
for a grievance committee as mere extensions of Myers’ dispute over her transfer to
another section of the criminal court.”).
48 Id. at 154.
49 Id. at 149.
50 Id. at 141.
51 Cf. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 417 (1979) (remanding
case to determine whether Givhan would in fact have been rehired but for her comments);
see also Mark Strasser, What’s It to You: The First Amendment and Matters of Public
Concern, 77 MO. L. REV. 1083, 1107 (2012) (“One might then expect at least a remand to
discern whether that question in particular had played a substantial role in the firing.”).
52 Connick, 461 U.S. at 151 (“We agree with the District Court that there is no
demonstration here that the questionnaire impeded Myers’ ability to perform her
responsibilities.”).
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position. After all, the Pickering Court had rejected the claim
that “the publication of the letter . . . would foment controversy and
conflict among the Board, teachers, administrators, and the
residents of the district,”53 because “no evidence to support these
allegations was introduced at the hearing.”54 But the Connick Court
took a different tack, reasoning that “[w]hen close working
relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide
degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.”55
The Court justified this deference to the employer’s
judgment by explaining that it would make little sense to require
“an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the
disruption of the office and the destruction of working
relationships is manifest before taking action.”56 The point of
deferring to the employer’s judgment is to allow the employer to
prevent the probable harm rather than force the public to endure
interrupted or lower quality service.57 Yet, the question before the
Court was whether the distribution of the questionnaire was likely
to undermine the efficiency of the district attorney’s office. If the
distribution did not undermine efficiency in the office, then a court
deferring to the employer’s judgmentmight not only fail to prevent
harm but might actually cause it. For example, Myers might have
been fired for reasons having nothing to do with efficiency.
The Court made its reasoning even more opaque when it
“caution[ed] that a stronger showing [of disruption] may be
necessary if the employee’s speech more substantially involved
matters of public concern.”58 Presumably, the Court was not
suggesting that the likelihood of harm was somehow correlated
with the degree to which the speech involved matters of public
concern but merely that the person wrongly punished for her
speech on private matters would not thereby have had her First
Amendment rights infringed.
Regrettably, the Court left open what speech would have
more substantially involved matters of public concern. For
53 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391
U.S. 563, 570 (1968).
54 Id.
55 Connick, 461 U.S. at 151–52; see also Stephen Allred, From Connick to
Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43,
49 (1988) (“[T]he Court made the Pickering balancing test more difficult to resolve in the
employee’s favor by ruling that the mere apprehension by a supervisor that disruption
of the work place might occur is a sufficient reason to tip the balance in favor of the state,
even though the employee spoke on a matter of public concern.”).
56 Connick, 461 U.S. at 152.
57 See id. at 151–52 (“When close working relationships are essential to fulfilling
public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.”).
58 Id. at 152 (“Myers’ questionnaire touched upon matters of public concern in
only a most limited sense.”).
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example, the Court’s decision did not illuminate if it would have
reached a different result if the public were more interested in
whether assistant district attorneys were pressured to work in
campaigns or whether, instead, a greater percentage of the
questions had to involve matters of public interest.59 The Court
explained “that the issue of whether assistant district attorneys
are pressured to work in political campaigns is a matter of
interest to the community upon which it is essential that public
employees be able to speak out freely without fear of retaliatory
dismissal.”60 Despite acknowledging this, the Court was then
rather deferential to the employer when assessing whether this
essential interest had been adequately protected. Such deference
casts doubt on the Court’s commitment to protecting the right of
public employees to speak freely.
D. Rankin v. McPherson
The Connick Court was rather deferential to the
employer with respect to whether workplace efficiency had been
impaired and thus the Court did not need to offer an assessment
of the kinds of considerations that might be a part of such an
analysis. But an important part of the Pickering analysis
involves the effect that challenged speech will have in the
workplace so it is necessary to discuss the kinds of factors that
would be relevant in any such analysis. Rankin v. McPherson61
offered some clues about the kinds of factors that would be
appropriate to consider.
At issue in Rankin were the comments of Ardith
McPherson, who had clerical duties in the Office of the Constable
in Harris County.62 After hearing about the attempted
assassination of President Reagan, she said, “[I]f they go for him
again, I hope they get him.”63 Unbeknownst to her, someone
overheard her comment and reported it to Constable Rankin.64
Rankin asked McPherson if she had made the remark and then
59 See id. at 148 (noting that only one of the questions involved a matter of
public interest).
60 Id. at 149.
61 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
62 Id. at 380 (“Ardith McPherson was appointed a deputy in the office of the
Constable of Harris County, Texas. . . . McPherson’s duties were purely clerical. Her
work station was a desk at which there was no telephone, in a room to which the public
did not have ready access.”).
63 Id. at 381.
64 Id.
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fired her when she admitted that she had.65 McPherson challenged
her firing as a violation of her First Amendment rights.66
The Court noted that the comments involved a matter of
public concern,67 both because it was made in the context of
discussing presidential policies68 and because it was a reaction
to an attempt on the President’s life.69 The Court then discussed
how to evaluate the workplace efficiency element. “Interference
with work, personnel relationships, or the speaker’s job
performance can detract from the public employer’s function;
avoiding such interference can be a strong state interest.”70Here,
although the comment was made while at work, “there [was] no
evidence that it interfered with the efficient functioning of the
office.”71 Indeed, her comments would not undermine her
relationship with Rankin if only because they had no contact
with each other.72 The Court held that McPherson could not be
fired for her comments.73
The Court pointed out some other factors, not applicable
in this case, that might be applicable in a different case. For
example, there was no evidence here that “McPherson had
discredited the office by making her statement in public.”74 Nor
had any member of the public heard her statement.75 Because
there had been no ill effects from her comments, her firing
violated her First Amendment rights.76 The Court implied,
however, that a different result might have been reached if, for
example, members of the public had overheard the comments.77
65 Id. at 382 (“McPherson readily admitted that she had made the statement,
but testified that she told Rankin, upon being asked if she made the statement, ‘Yes, but
I didn’t mean anything by it.’ . . . After their discussion, Rankin fired McPherson.”).
66 Id. at 382.
67 Id. at 386 (“Considering the statement in context, as Connick requires,
discloses that it plainly dealt with a matter of public concern.”).
68 Id. (“The statement was made in the course of a conversation addressing the
policies of the President’s administration.”).
69 Id. (“It came on the heels of a news bulletin regarding what is certainly a
matter of heightened public attention: an attempt on the life of the President.”).
70 Id. at 388.
71 Id. at 389.
72 Id. at 392 (“McPherson’s employment-related interaction with the Constable
was apparently negligible.”).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 389.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 392 (“Given the function of the agency, McPherson’s position in the
office, and the nature of her statement, we are not persuaded that Rankin’s interest in
discharging her outweighed her rights under the First Amendment.”).
77 The Court seemed worried about the negative effects that might have
resulted had those comments been heard by members of the public. See id. at 389 (“Nor
was there any danger that McPherson had discredited the office by making her
statement in public.”).
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E. Waters v. Churchill
Both Connick andRankin suggest that the determination of
whether expression concerns a matter of public, rather than mere
private interest, is relatively straightforward.78 There may be
instances, however, in which that determination is somewhat
difficult, and Waters v. Churchill discusses how the difficulties
associated with making such a determination might have
constitutional import.79 At issue in Waters was whether Churchill
could be fired for her comments to another nurse during a dinner
break.80Churchill was an obstetrics nurse and Perkins-Grahamwas
a nurse considering transferring to the obstetrics department.81
The contents of their conversation were in dispute.82
Churchill claimed to have expressed reservations about “the
hospital’s ‘cross-training’ policy, under which nurses from one
department could work in another when their usual location was
overstaffed.”83 Churchill worried that such a policy might
compromise patient care.84 Another nurse who overheard the
conversation described it as a negative assessment of the
department and of the supervisor.85 In any event, the
conversation led Perkins-Graham not to transfer to the
department,86 and Churchill was later fired for having made
those comments.87
If Churchill’s speech was simply about personnel
matters, such as her relationship with her supervisor, then it
would merely have been a matter of private interest.88 However,
if she was discussing patient safety or whether the hospital
policies were in accord with state regulations, then her speech
would have been a matter of public concern.89
78 See supraSection I.C (discussingConnick) & supraSection I.D (discussingRankin).
79 Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
80 Id. at 664.
81 Id.
82 See infra notes 83 and 89 and accompanying text.
83 Waters, 511 U.S. at 666.
84 Id. (“Churchill believed this policy threatened patient care because it was
designed not to train nurses but to cover staff shortages.”).
85 Id. at 665.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 664.
88 Id. at 667 (noting the district court’s finding that the speech was not on a
matter of public concern); see also Edward J. Velazquez, Waters v. Churchill:
Government-Employer Efficiency, Judicial Deference, and the Abandonment of Public-
Employee Free Speech by the Supreme Court, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1055, 1097 (1995)
(“[B]ecause the Court does not want to involve itself in what it perceives to be primarily
intra-office disputes, it is willing to construe ‘public concern’ quite narrowly.”).
89 Waters, 511 U.S. at 667 (discussing the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of why
this might be a matter of public concern).
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The Waters Court explained that for government
employee speech to be protected, “the speech must be on a
matter of public concern, and the employee’s interest in
expressing herself on this matter must not be outweighed by any
injury the speech could cause to ‘the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees.’”90 In this case, there was
disagreement about whether the conversation involved a matter of
public concern. One person overhearing it understood it as a critical
assessment of personnel practices,91 whereas others overhearing
the conversation believed that Churchill was correct when
describing it as involving a concern for patient safety.92
Even if the conversation did involve a matter of public
concern, a separate question before the Court was whether the
employer reasonably believed that it did not. The plurality
explained that “Government action based on protected speech
may under some circumstances violate the First Amendment
even if the government actor honestly believes the speech is
unprotected.”93 A mistaken view that the speech is unprotected,
however, will not alone establish that the First Amendment has
been violated as long as the employer reasonably believed that
the speech was unprotected.94 In contrast, an adverse
employment action would not be immunized from review if it
was based on very weak evidence or no evidence at all that the
speech was unprotected.95
Suppose that the punished expression is a matter of
public concern. The Court cautioned: “If an employment action
is based on what an employee supposedly said, and a reasonable
supervisor would recognize that there is a substantial likelihood
that what was actually said was protected, the manager must
tread with a certain amount of care.”96 Even if the speech is on a
matter of public concern, it may nonetheless be the basis for an
90 Id. at 668 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983)).
91 Id. at 665 (“Ballew said that Churchill ‘was knocking the department’ and
that ‘in general [Churchill] was saying what a bad place [obstetrics] is to work.’ Ballew
said she heard Churchill say Waters ‘was trying to find reasons to fire her.’ Ballew also
said Churchill described a patient complaint for which Waters had supposedly wrongly
blamed Churchill.”).
92 Id. at 666.
93 Id. at 669.
94 Id. at 677 (“[E]mployer decisionmaking will not be unduly burdened by
having courts look to the facts as the employer reasonably found them to be.” (emphasis
in original)).
95 Id. (“It may be unreasonable, for example, for the employer to come to a
conclusion based on no evidence at all. Likewise, it may be unreasonable for an employer
to act based on extremely weak evidence when strong evidence is clearly available . . . .”).
96 Id.
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adverse action if sufficiently disruptive. In this case, “the
potential disruptiveness of the speech as reported was enough to
outweigh whatever First Amendment value it might have had.”97
After all, “[d]iscouraging people from coming to work for a
department certainly qualifies as disruption.”98
Waters makes the jurisprudence more confusing rather
than less. Part of the decision was written to support the
government employer’s reasonable judgment that the speech
was only a matter of private interest.99 A different part of the
decision was about why the contested speech was too disruptive—
it dissuaded someone from transferring to the department100 and
the comments themselves were perceived as “unkind and
inappropriate.”101 In addition, Churchill’s comments “threatened to
undermine management’s authority”102 and there was reason for
“management [to] doubt Churchill’s future effectiveness.”103 But
including all of these very different elements gives lower courts
too little guidance about which factors to consider, how they
should be considered, or how heavily they should be weighed.
For example, accurate criticism about compromised patient care
might cause an individual not to transfer to the department and
thus might be viewed as disruptive. In addition, such comments
might be viewed as undermining management. The post-Waters
jurisprudence may not protect such comments.
It is not clear what to make of Waters,104 given the facts
and the likely mistaken assessment of the character of the
contested conversation.105 The Court characterized the
employer’s mistake as reasonable,106 although there were
indications that the witness who recounted the conversation to
the supervisor did not like Churchill.107 Further, there may have
been bad blood between Churchill and the supervisor, which
97 Id. at 680.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 679–80 (“[I]f petitioners really did believe Perkins–Graham’s and Ballew’s
story, and fired Churchill because of it, theymust win. Their belief, based on the investigation
they conducted, would have been entirely reasonable.”).
100 Id. at 680.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 680–81.
103 Id. at 681.
104 See id. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The approach to this case adopted by
Justice O’Connor’s opinion provides more questions than answers, subjecting public
employers to intolerable legal uncertainty.”).
105 See id. at 666 (“Koch’s and Welty’s recollections of the conversation match
Churchill’s.”).
106 Id. at 680 (“Their belief, based on the investigation they conducted, would
have been entirely reasonable.”).
107 Id. at 666 (“Churchill claims[ ] Ballew was biased against Churchill because of
an incident in which Ballew apparently made an error and Churchill had to cover for her.”).
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might have induced the supervisor to think the worst of
Churchill.108 Finally, if the bad relationship between Churchill
and the supervisor was the supervisor’s fault, then the
employer’s interpretation of Churchill’s comments may not have
been reasonable after all.
One element to be spelled out involves the ways in which
speech on a matter of public concern might be found sufficiently
disruptive to justify a termination. InWaters, it may well be that
the supervisory relationship had deteriorated, but the Court
seemed not to care aboutwhy that was so. Such an approachmight
undermine the effectiveness of First Amendment guarantees.
Consider Givhan, where the principal said that Givhan’s attitude
made it impossible for him to work with her. Certainly, the trier of
fact might not have believed his testimony, but his judgment
about his poor relationship with her might have been
reasonable, even if a separate question involved who was to
blame for that poor relationship.
If the Court believes the abridgment of First Amendment
rights is justified as long as there is some workplace efficiency
impairment, then an employer can virtually immunize her
employee-punishing expression by sincerely testifying about
how the employer-employee working relationship has broken
down. Churchill had implied that the supervisor was responsible
for their poor working relationship,109 but Churchill was
nonetheless characterized as undermining her supervisor’s
authority, and thus permissibly fired.110
F. Garcetti v. Ceballos
When Churchill was talking to Perkins-Graham, there
was no question that Churchill was not speaking as an
employee.111 The importance of the difference between an
individual speaking as a citizen or speaking as an employee was
emphasized in Garcetti v. Ceballos.112
Ceballos was a deputy district attorney in Los Angeles who
had certain supervisory responsibilities over other attorneys.113 He
was informed by a defense attorney that there were certain
irregularities in an affidavit used to justify the issuance of a
108 Cf. id. at 665 (“Ballew also said Churchill described a patient complaint for
which Waters had supposedly wrongly blamed Churchill.”).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 680–81.
111 See id. at 664. (implying that the encounter was an informal discussion
between two nurses during a dinner break).
112 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
113 Id. at 413.
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warrant.114 Ceballos determined that the affidavit contained some
“seriousmisrepresentations,”115 and he communicated his concerns
to his supervisors orally and in a memo.116 Ceballos, his
supervisors, and other interested parties attended a meeting to
discuss these matters, where the discussion became contentious.117
The defense attorney who had alerted Ceballos to the
affidavit’s deficiencies challenged the warrant in court.118 The
court rejected the challenge, Ceballos’s testimony on behalf of
the defense notwithstanding.119 Ceballos claimed that
subsequent to that hearing he was subjected to “retaliatory
employment actions.”120 Ceballos’s supervisors denied that there
had been retaliatory action and, in any event, claimed that
Ceballos’s speech was not protected.121 The district court held
that the memo was not protected speech because Ceballos wrote
it pursuant to his employment duties.122 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Ceballos’s
expression was amatter of public concern, although not reaching
whether he had made the speech as a private citizen.123
The Garcetti Court began its analysis by quoting
Pickering and then proceeded to analyze the elements required
to trigger First Amendment guarantees.124 The first issue to be
determined is “whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a
matter of public concern.”125 If not, the analysis stops in that “the
employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on his
or her employer’s reaction to the speech.”126 If the employee was
speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, then the
issue is “whether the relevant government entity had an
adequate justification for treating the employee differently from
.any other member of the general public.”127 The Court explained
114 Id.
115 Id. at 414.
116 Id.
117 Id. (“The meeting allegedly became heated, with one lieutenant sharply
criticizing Ceballos for his handling of the case.”).
118 Id. at 413–14.
119 Id. at 414–15.
120 Id. at 415.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 415–16.
124 Id. at 417 (“[T]he First Amendment protects a public employee’s right, in
certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.” (citing
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty. Ill., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968)).
125 Id. at 418 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205,
Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1995)).
126 Id. (citing Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).
127 Id.
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that a “government entity has broader discretion to restrict
speech when it acts in its role as employer, but the restrictions
it imposes must be directed at speech that has some potential to
affect the entity’s operations.”128
Unlike Pickering’s speech, Ceballos’s speech occurred
within the office. But that did not end the Court’s analysis. “That
Ceballos expressed his views inside his office, rather than
publicly, is not dispositive.”129 Further, merely because the
“memo concerned the subject matter of Ceballos’ employment”130
also did not end the analysis. Instead, the dispositive factor was
that “his expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a
calendar deputy.”131 The Court reasoned that “[r]estricting
speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee
might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”132 The Court summed
up its holding by saying: “[W]hen public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from
employer discipline.”133
The Garcetti Court understood that its comments about
public employee speech might have important implications in
the academic context, acknowledging that “[t]here is some
argument that expression related to academic scholarship or
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional
interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s
customary employee-speech jurisprudence.”134 Yet the Court
expressly refused to address whether the Garcetti analysis
“would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech
related to scholarship or teaching.”135
In his dissent, Justice Souter noted that the Garcetti
rationale would seem “to include even the teaching of a public
university professor.”136 He expressed the “hope that today’s
majority does not mean to imperil First Amendment protection
of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose
teachers necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant to . . . official
128 Id.
129 Id. at 420.
130 Id. at 421.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 421–22.
133 Id. at 421.
134 Id. at 425.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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duties.’”137 Undermining academic freedom would adversely
impact teachers, students, and society as whole. In Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, the Court noted that “[o]ur Nation is deeply
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned.”138 The Keyishian Court feared that imposing burdens
on a teacher for her teaching or scholarship would have readily
foreseeable effects—”[i]t would be a bold teacher who would not
stay as far as possible from utterances or acts which might
jeopardize his living. . . .”139 So, too, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
the Court recognized the importance of not “imping[ing] upon such
highly sensitive areas as . . . freedom of communication of ideas,
particularly in the academic community.”140
Yet, the Court’s suggestion that teaching and research
may be more protected is not particularly helpful, because that
leaves open whether more protection is afforded to those areas
and, if so, how much more protection is accorded. Those issues
have been left to the circuits to determine.
II. ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE CIRCUITS
Analyses of when teachers can be punished for their
speech are quite complicated, especially post-Garcetti. A court
must determine whether the teacher’s speech was made as a
citizen or as an employee. If the teacher made the speech as an
employee rather than as a citizen, then First Amendment
protections will not be triggered, although theymight be triggered
if the comments were made in the context of teaching or research.
Even if First Amendment protections are thereby triggered, how
much protection is added has not been specified and the First
Amendment protection may be overridden if the speech causes
workplace disruption. Such a jurisprudential approach has led to
similar cases being decided differently in the circuits.
137 Id.; see also Bridget R. Nugent & Julee T. Flood, Rescuing Academic Freedom
from Garcetti v. Ceballos: An Evaluation of Current Case Law and A Proposal for the
Protection of Core Academic, Administrative, and Advisory Speech, 40 J.C. & U.L. 115, 131
(2014) (“Construing speech related to scholarship or research as pursuant to ‘official duties’
under theGarcetti standard runs the risk of inhibiting the free pursuit of unpopular or socially
charged ideas—precisely what the First Amendment was designed to protect.”).
138 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
139 Id. at 601.
140 Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 245 (1957).
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A. Teaching
Garcetti suggests that the First Amendment protections
under the Pickering line of cases are not triggered insofar as an
individual speaks as an employee.141 The Garcetti exception,
however, may be inapplicable insofar as the employee’s speech
is made in the course of teaching or research.142 But even if the
Garcetti exception is not triggered, First Amendment interests
may still be outweighed if the speech causes workplace
disruption,143 which makes the determination of what
constitutes workplace disruption very important.
Consider Silva v. University of New Hampshire, a case
involving a tenured instructor at the University of New
Hampshire144 who taught a course in technical writing.145
Students complained that some of Silva’s comparisons in class146
and some of his comments in the library were “personally and/or
sexually offensive.”147 The students “all expressed a fear of going
to speak to him directly because they would never wish to be
alone with him.”148 One of the students suggested that Silva’s
sexual comments were pervasive.149 The university created
shadow classes so that students who did not feel comfortable in
Silva’s class could take the course with someone else.150 Many
students took advantage of that opportunity.151
Despite the evidence of workplace difficulties, as
evidenced by all of the students who took the shadow class and
by the student complaints, the court found that Silva’s First
141 Jayne Chen,When Public Employees Speak Out on Issues of Public Concern:
The Applicability of Pickering in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDICIARY 642, 659 (2007) (“Justice Kennedy holds that the Pickering balancing test
does not apply in Garcetti, and that statements made by public employees pursuant to
their official duties are not subject to First Amendment protection.”).
142 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
143 Cf. Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Speak No Evil: Academic Freedom
and the Application of Garcetti v. Ceballos to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U.L.
REV. 125, 180 (2009) (“The state may prove that its interest in avoiding actual disruption
of the workplace outweighs the employee’s right to speak out . . . .”).
144 Silva v. Univ. of New Hampshire, 888 F. Supp. 293, 297 (D.N.H. 1994).
145 Id. at 298.
146 Id. at 300.
147 Id.; See, e.g., id. at 305 (“I was on the floor in the card indexes looking up
books. Don Silva stopped, saw me on my hands & knees pulling out a floor level card
index. Kate & Nikki heard him say to me ‘You look like you’ve had alot [sic] of experience
on your knees.’ I didn’t hear him. Kate & Nikki looked at each other in disbelief and then
told me.”).
148 Id. at 300.
149 Id. at 301 (“He has yet to hold a class in which he did not make a sexually
suggestive, or bluntly sexual statement.”).
150 Id. at 303.
151 Id. at 307 (“Twenty-six students, including the complainants, changed
sections when presented with the opportunity.”).
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Amendment rights had been violated when he had been
disciplined for his speech.152 The speech at issue included Silva
having “described a ‘belly dancer’ as being like a bowl of jello
being stimulated by a vibrator”153 or his having described focus
in technical writing as “like going in and out, side to side, and
loosening up so you could find the best target area.”154
Notwithstanding the obvious discomfort of some of the students,
the Silva court concluded that the university sexual harassment
policy “as applied to Silva’s classroom speech is not reasonably
related to the legitimate pedagogical purpose of providing a
congenial academic environment because it employs an
impermissibly subjective standard that fails to take into account
the nation’s interest in academic freedom.”155 The court believed
that Silva’s classroom comments had the “the legitimate
pedagogical, public purpose of conveying certain principles
related to the subject matter of his course.”156
Silva might helpfully be contrasted with a United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit case, Bonnell v. Lorenzo.157
Jon Bonnell was a teacher at MacComb Community College158
who frequently used the words “fuck,” “pussy,” and “cunt” in the
classroom.159 Bonnell claimed that “none of the terms at issue
were directed to a particular student and were only used for
demonstrating an academic point,”160 namely, to discuss “the
chauvinistic degrading attitudes in society that depict women as
sexual objects, as compared to certain words to describe male
genitalia, which are not taboo or considered to be deliberately
intended to degrade.”161
One semester, a student complained that Bonnell used
lewd, obscene and sexually explicit comments in connection with
stories that the class was reading.162 The student claimed to have
been adversely affected mentally and emotionally, and was
prepared “to take this sexual harassment complaint to the
highest level of authority it can go.”163 The school provided
Bonnell with a copy of the complaint.164 Hemade copies of it after
152 See id. at 313.
153 Id. at 300.
154 Id. at 301.
155 Id. at 314 (emphasis in original).
156 Id. at 316 (emphasis in original).
157 Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2001).
158 See id. at 802.
159 See id. at 803.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 See id. at 804.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 805.
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redacting the student’s name, and passed out the copies to the
students in his six classes165 and to over two hundred faculty
members.166 He also gave a copy of the complaint to the local
newspaper and some local TV stations.167
Eventually, he was suspended for a semester.168 The Sixth
Circuit upheld the sanction imposed, finding that Bonnell’s
interest in academic freedom did not outweigh the interests of the
college, which included “maintaining a disruption-free
environment, and maintaining its federal funding.”169 Bonnell and
Silva both pervasively used sexually suggestive language,170
allegedly for legitimate pedagogical purposes. One was protected
by the First Amendment and the other was not.
The Sixth Circuit contrasted Bonnell with another case it
decided that same year: Hardy v. Jefferson Community
College.171 Hardy involved a community college’s decision not to
renew an instructor’s contract for fear that student enrollment
would otherwise decline.172 Kenneth Hardy taught an
Introduction to Interpersonal Communication class, “where the
students examined how language is used to marginalize
minorities and other oppressed groups in society.”173 He solicited
examples of such language from the students and included in
“their suggestions were the words ‘girl,’ ‘lady,’ ‘faggot,’ ‘nigger,’
and ‘bitch.’”174 One student complained175 because she felt that
the introduction of these words into the class was “in direct
contravention of Hardy’s stated policy prohibiting the use of
offensive language in class.”176
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 806.
168 Id. at 808.
169 Id. at 811; see also id. at 823 (“[W]e believe that Defendants’ purported interests,
including maintaining the confidentiality of student sexual harassment complaints,
disciplining teachers who retaliate against students who file sexual harassment claims, and
creating an atmosphere free of faculty disruption, outweigh Plaintiff ’ s purported interests.”).
170 See Silva, 888 F. Supp. at 299 (“In his affidavit, Silva states, ‘I had used both
examples in my classes on numerous prior occasions . . . .’”); Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 805
(including a memo written by the Dean which found that Bonnell “made it a practice (as
announced to the class at the start of the term) to swear in the classroom, using such
words as ‘shit,’ ‘damn,’ ‘fuck,’ and ‘ass.’”).
171 Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671 (6th Cir. 2001).
172 Id. at 674 (“When the minister threatened that African–American enrollment
would decline unless the dispute was resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining student,
Hardy’s teaching contract was not renewed.”).
173 Id.
174 Id. at 675.
175 Id. (“One African–American student, however, objected to the in-class use of
the words ‘nigger’ and ‘bitch,’ and complained to Hardy and his superiors.”).
176 Id.
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When the acting dean asked Hardy why he used offensive
words in class, Hardy “attempted to explain that this and other
words were analyzed as illustrations of highly offensive, powerful
language, and that it was not used in an ‘abusive’ manner . . . .”177
The dean mentioned that “a ‘prominent citizen’ representing the
interests of the African American community had become involved
and had threatened to affect the school’s already-declining
enrollment if corrective action was not taken.”178 Hardy was never
again hired to teach after that semester.179
When examining whether Hardy’s First Amendment
rights had been violated, the Sixth Circuit considered whether
his words involved matters of public concern. “Speech that
relates ‘to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community’ touches upon matters of public concern.’”180 But the
court stressed that it was also important to “determine ‘the point
of the speech in question . . . [because] [c]ontroversial parts of
speech advancing only private interests do not necessarily
invoke First Amendment protection.’”181 The court noted that
“Hardy’s in-class use of the objectionable word[s] [were]
germane to the subject matter of his lecture on the power and
effect of language.”182
The Sixth Circuit admitted that this incident “did have
the effect of creating disharmony between Hardy and the College
administrators. . . .”183 Further, the administration seemed to
take quite seriously “the potential disruption in school
operations and enrollment that might have occurred had
Reverend Coleman become more involved in the matter.”184 But
the court dismissed the enrollment concern, describing it as
“present[ing] a classic illustration of ‘undifferentiated fear’ of
disturbance on the part of the College’s academic administrators.”
185 After noting that the administrators became interested “[o]nly
after Reverend Coleman voiced his opposition to the classroom
discussion,”186 the court nowhere discussed whether the
177 Id. at 675.
178 Id.
179 See id. at 674.
180 Id. at 678 (quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).
181 Id. (quoting Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d, 1177–87 (6th Cir. 1995)).
182 Id. at 679.
183 Id. at 681.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 682; see also Joseph J. Martins, Tipping the Pickering Balance: A
Proposal for Heightened First Amendment Protection for the Teaching and Scholarship
of Public University Professors, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 649, 679 (2016) (“[T]he
Sixth Circuit found the College’s prediction to be nothing more than the ‘undifferentiated
fear’ of disturbance, which is never sufficient to overcome the freedom of expression.”).
186 Hardy, 260 F.3d at 682.
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Reverend could make good on the “threat[ ] to affect the school’s
already-declining enrollment if corrective action was not
taken.”187 It is simply unclear whether the Sixth Circuit found
that having Hardy return would not result in lower student
enrollment or whether, instead, Hardy’s academic freedom
rights outweighed the college’s interests, notwithstanding the
legitimate fear that student enrollment might suffer and
notwithstanding the strained relationship between Hardy and
the administration.188 The court ultimately held Hardy’s First
Amendment rights had been violated.189
One reason that the Sixth Circuit held Hardy’s rights to
academic freedom were violated was that there had only been
one instance inwhich the offensivewords had been used190 and there
had been an academic purpose behind their use.191 Yet, the fact that
there was a single incident and that the teacher had a good purpose
will not always be immunizing, as a case decided in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit illustrates.
Brown v. Chicago Board of Education192 involved Lincoln
Brown, a sixth grade public school teacher,193 who had “caught
his students passing a note in class [with] . . . among other
things, music lyrics with the offensive word ‘nigger.’”194 The
Board of Education had a policy prohibiting teacher use of racial
epithets in front of students regardless of motivation.195 Policy
notwithstanding, Brown used the opportunity to try to show why
racial epithets are hurtful and should not be used.196 The
principal happened to witness the incident and Brown was
suspended soon thereafter.197
Brown challenged the suspension.198 The Seventh Circuit
reasoned that “[w]hether a public employee’s speech is
constitutionally protected depends on ‘whether the employee
187 Id. at 675.
188 See id. at 682.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 681.
191 Id. at 679.
192 Brown v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 824 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2016).
193 Id. at 714.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. Brown was accused of violating Section 3.3 of the Employee Discipline
and Due Process Policy which “prohibits ‘[u]sing verbally abusive language to or in front
of students.’” See id. at 716. Brown articulated the offensive word; see also id. at 718
(“Brown is indignant that he was suspended for using a racial slur while attempting to
teach his students why such language is inappropriate.”).
197 Id. at 714–15.
198 Brown, 824 F.3d at 715.
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spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.’”199 Because
“Brown himself [ ] emphasized that he was speaking as a
teacher—that is to say, as an employee—not as a citizen,”200 the
court held that his speech was not protected.201
The Brown court noted that there was some question
“whether the Garcetti rule applies in the same way to ‘a case
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching,’”202 because
that issue had not been before the Garcetti Court.203 However,
the Seventh Circuit had previously “concluded that a teacher’s
in–classroom speech is not the speech of a ‘citizen’ for First
Amendment purposes,”204 at least if the teacher is in a primary
or secondary school rather than in a university setting.205 Such a
distinction was thought appropriate in light of “the long-
standing recognition that academic freedom in a university is ‘a
special concern of the First Amendment’ because of the
university’s unique role in participating in and fostering a
marketplace of ideas.”206 Because Brown had made the speech as
a primary school teacher rather than as a citizen, his being
punished did not abridge First Amendment guarantees.207
The Sixth Circuit has also expressed reluctance to offer
First Amendment protections to primary and secondary school
teachers when their in-classroom speech is at issue. Evans-
Marshall v. Board of Education208 involved an English teacher,
Shelley Evans-Marshall, who had gotten parent complaints
when she had assigned the books Heather Has Two Mommies
199 Id. (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)) (citing Pickering
v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
200 Id.
201 Id. at 718 (“The Board may have acted in a short-sighted way when it
suspended him for his effort to educate the students about a sensitive and socially
important issue, but it did not trample on his First Amendment rights.”).
202 Id. at 715 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425).
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 The Second Circuit has also applied Garcetti in the primary/secondary
school context, although that case involved a union grievance filed as a result of the
administration’s failure to punish a child for misbehaving in school. See Weintraub v.
Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 593 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Weintraub, by filing a
grievance with his union to complain about his supervisor’s failure to discipline a child
in his classroom, was speaking pursuant to his official duties and thus not as a citizen.”);
see also id. at 203 (“[U]nder the First Amendment, speech can be ‘pursuant to’ a public
employee’s official job duties even though it is not required by, or included in, the
employee’s job description, or in response to a request by the employer.”).
206 Brown, 824 F.3d at 716 (quoting Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 411 (9th
Cir. 2014)).
207 See id. at 715 (“Brown’s First Amendment claim fails right out of the gate.
Public–employee speech is subject to a special set of rules for First Amendment
purposes.”).
208 Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 624
F.3d 332, 335 (6th Cir. 2010).
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and Siddhartha to her students.209 When her contract was not
renewed, Evans-Marshall argued that she had been subjected to
retaliation for her “curricular and pedagogical choices.”210 The
Sixth Circuit explained that “when Evans-Marshall taught 9th
grade English, she did something she was hired (and paid) to do,
something she could not have done but for the Board’s decision
to hire her as a public school teacher.”211 Noting that it might be
very difficult to organize a coherent curriculum through all of
high school if each teacher had the right to choose whatever texts
she desired,212 the court held that “the First Amendment does
not protect primary and secondary school teachers’ in-class
curricular speech . . . .”213
Yet, it should not be thought that the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits are therefore viewing academic freedom at the
university level as immunizing professor’s in-class comments.
Piggee v. Carl Sandburg College involved “a part-time instructor of
cosmetology at Carl Sandburg College who gave a gay student two
religious pamphlets on the sinfulness of homosexuality.”214 The
student complained and the college found that the instructor had
engaged in sexual harassment.215 While this student was the only
one to complain formally,216 Piggee admitted that she had given
other students those same pamphlets.217
The Seventh Circuit did not find Garcetti directly
relevant.218 However, the court noted that Piggee’s speech was
not only not directly relevant to her job but in fact might have
impeded her ability to work with students.219 In course
evaluations, over half of the students in her class commented
209 Id.
210 Id. at 336.
211 Id. at 340.
212 See id. at 341.
213 Id. at 342. It is not clear that the Sixth Circuit is emphasizing the difference
between primary and secondary education on the one hand and university education on
the other. See Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732, 738 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Savage’s speech was not
protected by the First Amendment because the speech was made pursuant to his duties as
Head of Reference and Library Instruction [at the University].” (citing Evans-Marshall,
624 F.3d at 339–40)).
214 Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 668 (7th Cir. 2006).
215 Id. (“After the college looked into the matter, it found that Piggee had
sexually harassed the student.”).
216 Id. at 672.
217 Id.
218 Id. (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Ceballos is not directly relevant to our
problem . . . .”).
219 Id. (“Piggee’s ‘speech,’ both verbal and through the pamphlets she put in
Ruel’s pocket, was not related to her job of instructing students in cosmetology. Indeed,
if it did anything, it inhibited her ability to perform that job by undermining her
relationship with Ruel and other students who disagreed with or were offended by her
expressions of her beliefs.”).
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about her bringing religion into the classroom,220 which one
student found especially rankling because the students had been
instructed not to bring up religion in the salon.221 The Piggee
court suggested that while the contents at issue were matters of
public concern222 that alone did not establish that the discussion
was appropriate in the classroom.223 While instructors must have
some latitude in the discussion of course content as a matter of
academic freedom,224 that does not give instructors license to offer
extensive discussions of matters unrelated to the course’s subject
matter.225 By the same token, Bonnell suggests that instructors on
the college level are not given carte blanche to make whatever
comments they want in the course of their instruction.226
While the Sixth and Seventh Circuits are persuasive
when suggesting that academic freedom does not immunize all
actions in the teaching context,227 the courts could have been
more helpful in clarifying how particular factors should be
weighed. For example, the Bonnell court suggested that a fear of
a loss of federal funding was a legitimate consideration when
deciding to override an instructor’s First Amendment
interests,228 but the Hardy court dismissed concerns about
whether retention of an instructor would have had a negative
effect on enrollment.229 The Sixth Circuit would have been more
220 Piggee, 464 F.3d at 672 (“Out of eight student evaluations of Piggee’s
performance from the fall semester of 2001, five spoke about Piggee’s emphasis on religion.”).
221 Id. (“One student wrote ‘Mrs. Piggee usually inquires [sic] her religion into
everyday. Some people don’t always agree w/ what she feel. I think that if we are taught
that we are not to speak of our religions in the salon, neither should she.’”).
222 Id. at 671 (“[S]peech about religion, or speech about the pros and cons of
homosexual behavior, plainly deals with a topic that richly deserves full public
discussion.”).
223 Id. (“The real question, however, is whether the college had the right to
insist that Piggee refrain from engaging in that particular speech while serving as an
instructor of cosmetology.”).
224 Id. (“[T]he instructor’s freedom to express her views on the assigned course
is protected.”).
225 Id. (“No college or university is required to allow a chemistry professor to
devote extensive classroom time to the teaching of James Joyce’s demanding novel
Ulysses, nor must it permit a professor of mathematics to fill her class hours with
instruction on the law of torts.”).
226 See Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 820 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Plaintiff may
have a constitutional right to use words such as ‘pussy,’ ‘cunt,’ and ‘fuck,’ but he does not
have a constitutional right to use them in a classroom setting where they are not germane to
the subject matter, in contravention of the College’s sexual harassment policy.”).
227 Amy H. Candido, A Right to Talk Dirty?: Academic Freedom Values and
Sexual Harassment in the University Classroom, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 85, 85
(1997) (“We should neither allow professors to invoke academic freedom to avoid the
consequences of discrimination against women in the classroom, nor allow highly
constrictive regulation of classroom speech in the name of nondiscrimination to destroy
the important goals of academic freedom.”).
228 See Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 811.
229 See Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 681–82 (6th Cir. 2001).
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helpful had it made clear whether the difference between
Bonnell and Hardy involved the likelihood of the loss of monies
or, instead, other factors.
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit made its position relatively clear on whether
academic freedom could be overridden because of financial
concerns. Dube v. State University of New York involved the
tenure denial of a professor who taught that Nazism in
Germany, apartheid in South Africa, and Zionism in Israel were
all forms of racism.230 There were public protests231 and a threat
by a legislator that he would try to get school funding reduced if
Dube were permitted to continue to teach.232 Alumni said that
they would no longer donate to the university and that they
would urge students to matriculate elsewhere.233
Dube alleged that his tenure denial was due to the
controversy surrounding his teaching,234 an issue that would be
settled on remand.235 When offering guidance to the lower court,
the Second Circuit did not undercut the accuracy of the contention
that there would have been a loss of funding from the state or from
private donors had Dube been granted tenure. Nor did the court
say that the loss of funding would justify the tenure denial under
Pickering. Instead, the court suggested that Dube’s First
Amendment rights were violated if the controversy was the basis
for his tenure denial.236 The court thereby made clear that its
analysis of the issue did not depend upon the relative likelihood
that funding might be reduced if the controversial professor were
accorded tenure. Instead, the SecondCircuit’s primary concernwas
whether Dube spoke on a matter of public concern.237
A separate issue is whether the Second Circuit’s holding
accurately reflects the Court’s jurisprudence. If Pickering
permits school administrations to make tenure and promotion
decisions based in part on whether a faculty member’s speech
230 Dube v. State University of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 589 (2d Cir. 1990).
231 Id. at 597.
232 Id. at 590.
233 Id.
234 See id. at 597 (“This and other evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to Dube and in the context of the public protests and threats to defund Stony Brook
programs, could lead a reasonable jury to find that Dube was denied tenure as a result
of the controversy surrounding his teaching.”).
235 See id. at 598.
236 Id. (“Dube’s First Amendment claim will proceed to trial and, as Judge
Mishler observed, defendants may defend against that claim on the merits by contending
that they denied tenure and promotion to Dube for permissible academic reasons,
without regard to community pressure triggered by Dube’s teaching on Zionism and
racism, and that the controversy resulting from that teaching did not affect the outcome
of the decision regarding tenure and promotion.”).
237 See id.
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“undermine[s] a legitimate goal or mission of the employer,”238
then one would expect Pickering to allow tenure decisions to be
based on wealthy donor preferences. If, as the Second Circuit
suggests, academic freedom must mean at the very least that
professors cannot be denied tenure merely because they
displease wealthy donors, then the Supreme Court must clarify
how Pickering should be applied in the academic context.
B. Research and Expression
At the university level, research is often an important
component of a professor’s job responsibilities. One element of
research may involve applying for and receiving funding.
Garcetti raises questions about the protections afforded to
academics who are seeking grants, especially if seeking grants
is either expressly part of their job or is understood to be part of
their research responsibilities.
Renken v. Gregory involved a dispute between a professor
and his home institution regarding how funds from a grant
would be used.239 Renken applied for, and received a grant from
the National Science Foundation (NSF),240 which was contingent on
the university also providing funding.241 The university spelled out
what it would do so that the monies would be awarded,242 but
Renken offered a number of criticisms of the university’s proposal243
including a charge that the university’s proposal violated NSF
rules.244 Eventually, because Renken and the university could not
agree about the conditions underwhich the grantwould be accepted,
the university simply returned the grant.245
Renken filed suit, claiming that the grant had been
returned and that his salary had been reduced in retaliation for
his having criticized the university’s planned use of the grant
238 Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 680 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563,
569–70 (1968)).
239 Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2008).
240 Id. at 771.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id. (“Renken and Reisel sent Gregory a letter cataloguing a list of criticisms
regarding the project: a lack of lab space for the project, Gregory’s proposal for the use of
certain funds for the labs, Gregory’s decision about course releases related to the project,
and the delay in paying undergraduates working on the project, and the CEAS’s
administration delay in processing purchase orders relating to the project and the
resulting loss of certain vendors.”).
244 Id. (“Citing NSF instructions regarding program solicitations Renken and
Reisel contended that Gregory’s fund proposal contravened NSF regulations regarding
matching funds.”).
245 Id. at 773.
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funds.246 One of the questions at hand was whether Renken’s
First Amendment rights had been violated, and that depended
in part on whether he was speaking as a private citizen or an
employee when criticizing the university.247
Renken argued that because he was not required to do all
of this work in relation to the NSF grant, he was speaking as a
citizen rather than as an employee.248 However, the Seventh
Circuit rejected that analysis, reasoning instead that “Renken
was speaking as a faculty employee, and not as a private citizen,
because administering the grant as a [principal investigator] fell
within the teaching and service duties that he was employed to
perform.”249 The court further explained that “whether Renkenwas
explicitly required to apply for grants does not address whether his
efforts related to the grant, including his complaints, were ameans
to fulfill his employment requirements, namely teaching and
research.”250 But that analysis at least suggests that First
Amendment protections will not be triggered even if a professor is
sanctioned because the school’s administration disagrees with the
views the professor expressed in teaching or research.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has offered a much different understanding of Garcetti’s
application in the academic context. At issue in Adams v.
Trustees of the University of North Carolina-Wilmington251 was
a claim by Michael Adams that he had been denied promotion to
full professor in retaliation for his speech. Adams had been
promoted to associate professor with tenure in the Department
of Sociology and Criminal Justice at the University of North
Carolina-Wilmington.252 Subsequent to his promotion, he
“became a Christian, a conversion that transformed not only his
246 Id. (“Renken alleged that the University had reduced his pay and terminated
the NSF grant in retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights when he
criticized and complained about the University’s proposed use of the grant funds.”).
247 Id. (“The district court granted the University’s motion for summary
judgment, concluding that Renken’s complaints about the grant funding were made as
part of his official duties, rather than as citizen, and therefore were not protected by the
First Amendment.”). The district court had also suggested that Renken’s complaints
about the use of the grant involved a matter of private rather than public interest. See
id. (“Alternatively, the district court concluded that if Renken spoke as a citizen and not
as part of his official duties, his speech was still not protected because it related to a
matter of private interest.”).
248 Id. (“Renken argues that the tasks that he conducted in relation to the grant
were implemented at his discretion ‘while in the course of his job and not as a
requirement of his job.’” (emphasis in original)).
249 Id. at 774 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)).
250 Id. at 774; cf. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 (“When he went to work and
performed the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos acted as a government employee.”).
251 Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of North Carolina-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th
Cir. 2011).
252 Id. at 553.
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religious beliefs, but also his ideological views.”253 He became
quite vocal about those views.254 Some members of the university
community expressed discomfort about his views and how he
expressed them,255 as did some members of the Board of Trustees
and the public more generally.256 At one point, he was advised by
the interim chair of the department to be more “cerebral” and
less “caustic.”257
Adams argued that he had been denied promotion to full
professor in retaliation for expressing Christian views.258 The
district court granted summary judgment to the university, at
least in part, because it read Garcetti to suggest that Adams’
expression was made as a university employee and not as a
citizen; thus the speech was not protected.259 The district court’s
analysis was complicated by its finding that Adams’ speech was
initially protected but became unprotected when submitted as part
of his application for promotion.260 While the Fourth Circuit
rejected the district court’s alchemistic approach,261 it also chided
the district court for “appl[ying] Garcetti without acknowledging,
let alone addressing, the clear language in that opinion that casts
doubt on whether the Garcetti analysis applies in the academic
context of a public university.”262
253 Id.
254 Id. (“Adams became increasingly vocal about various political and social
issues that arose within both the UNCW community and society at large.”).
255 Id. (“Some UNCW employees indicated discomfort with Adams’ views and
his manner of expressing them.”); see also Matthew Jay Hertzog, The Misapplication of
Garcetti in Higher Education, 2015 BYUEDUC. & L.J. 203, 215 (2015) (“‘Over the years,
Adams became even more vocal in his views and tension developed between him and
several of his colleagues. As these tensions mounted, complaints concerning his public
beliefs and values from the Board of Trustees and the surrounding community began to
find their way to the university administration.”).
256 Adams, 640 F.3d at 553 (“From time to time, UNCW officials fielded
complaints from members of the Board of Trustees, the faculty and staff, and the general
public about Adams’ public expressions of his views.”).
257 Id.
258 Id. at 557 (“Adams asserted the Defendants violated Title VII’s protection
against religious discrimination by ‘subjecting [him] to numerous, intrusive, and
harassing investigations, asking him to terminate his First Amendment activities, and
refusing to promote him to full professor because of his outspoken Christian and
conservative beliefs.’”).
259 Id. at 561 (“Citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) . . ., for the
proposition that ‘when a public employee makes a statement pursuant to his “official
duties,” he does not “speak as a citizen,”’ the district court observed that it ‘must focus
not on the content of the speech but on the role the speaker occupied when he said it.’”).
260 Id. at 561–62 (“[T]he court’s basis for determining the First Amendment did
not protect Adams’ speech was Adams’ subsequent inclusion of past protected speech as
part of his promotion application. In effect, the district court held that Adams’ speech in
his columns, books, and commentaries, although undoubtedly protected speech when
given, was somehow transformed into unprotected speech.”).
261 Id. at 562 (“[W]e find the district court’s conclusion that Adams’ speech was
converted from protected to unprotected speech to be error as a matter of law.”).
262 Id. at 561.
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The Fourth Circuit did not reject the assertion that
Garcetti was ever applicable in the university setting, instead
reasoning that “[t]here may be instances in which a public
university faculty member’s assigned duties include a specific
role in declaring or administering university policy, as opposed
to scholarship or teaching.”263 The case was remanded for further
consideration of whether Adams’ First Amendment rights had
been violated.264 The Fourth Circuit, however, suggested that the
university had presented a non-invidious reason for the
promotion denial, namely, that Adams had too few peer-reviewed,
single author publications since his last promotion.265
Nonetheless, a separate question before the court was whether
the university in fact denied Adams the promotion in violation
of his First Amendment rights.266
The facts of Adams illustrate one of the confusing points
of the Pickering analysis in the academic setting. Suppose a
different sanction had been at issue (e.g., a suspension or a
tenure denial). Suppose further that the university had justified
its adverse action by saying that while Adams had met the
requirements for teaching and research, his manner of
expressing his views had undermined workplace efficiency
because many of his colleagues now found it too difficult to work
with him. It is simply unclear whether Pickeringwould allow the
university to impose sanctions in light of this workplace
efficiency justification. It is further unclear whether it would
matter whether the alleged difficulties in working together were
based on the content of his speech rather than the manner in
which those contents had been communicated.267
The Fourth Circuit is not the only circuit to question the
applicability of Garcetti in the context of academia. The Ninth
Circuit expressed a similar view in Demers v. Austin.268 At issue
was whether David Demers had been subjected to retaliatory
action because of a pamphlet he had written and because he had
263 Id. at 563.
264 Id. at 566.
265 Id. at 559 (“The Defendants offered numerous legitimate reasons for the
decision not to promote Adams, including the small number of peer-reviewed single author
publications since Adams’ last promotion.”); See also Mark P. Strasser, The Onslaught on
Academic Freedom, 81 UMKC L. REV. 657, 680 (2013) (noting that Adams “will not be
successful if the university can show independent reasons for Adams being denied the
promotion and that he would not have received the promotion even if he had never made
those comments”).
266 See Adams, 640 F.3d at 566 (“[W]e reverse the district court’s grant of
summary judgment as to Adams’ First Amendment claims of viewpoint discrimination
and retaliation.”).
267 Cf. supra Section I.B (discussing Givhan).
268 Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014).
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distributed some chapters of a book that he was in the process of
writing.269 The pamphlet, called “The 7-Step Plan” (the Plan),
concerned a method by which the Murrow School, then a part of
the College of Liberal Arts at Washington State University,
could become a freestanding college.270 Demers wrote the
pamphlet while serving on a Murrow School committee that was
actively debating the issues Demers raised in the Plan.271
The Demers court began its analysis by holding that
“Garcetti does not apply to ‘speech related to scholarship or
teaching.’”272 Indeed, the court went even farther when concluding
that Garcetti, “consistent with the First Amendment, cannot [ ]
apply to teaching and academic writing that are performed
‘pursuant to the official duties’ of a teacher and professor.”273
Ironically, the Plan did not seem to fall into the teaching or research
exception, because it instead was recommending a reorganization
plan for the college.274 The sample book chapterswere not considered
because they had not been made part of the record.275
The point here is not that Garcetti applied after all.
Arguably, the Plan was protected under the First Amendment if
he was presenting it as a private citizen rather than an
employee. Indeed, he and his company had offered a donation to
269 Id. at 406 (“He brought suit alleging that university administrators
retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment for distributing a short
pamphlet and drafts from an in-progress book.”).
270 Id. at 406–07.
271 Id. at 407.
272 Id. at 406 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006)); see also Pat
Fackrell, Demers v. Austin: The Ninth Circuit Resolves the Public Employee Speech
Doctrine’s Uncertain Application to Academic Speech, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 513, 515 (2015)
(“The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Demers further distinguishes the Ninth Circuit from
three other circuits—the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits. Because these circuits have
declined to resolve whether an academic speech exception may exist, these circuits apply
Garcetti’s official duties inquiry and have typically held that a university professor or
faculty member who speaks pursuant to his official duties is not entitled to First
Amendment protection on grounds that he is speaking pursuant to his official duties, not
as a private citizen.” (footnotes omitted)); Martins, supra note 185, at 666 (“The Ninth
Circuit thereby carved an explicit exception into Garcetti for academic scholarship and
classroom instruction.”).
273 Demers, 746 F.3d at 412.
274 Employment Law—Free Speech Rights—Ninth Circuit Finds Garcetti
Official Duty Rule Inapplicable to Professional Speech in Public-University Context.—
Demers v. Austin, No. 11-35558, 2014 WL 306321 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2014)., 127 HARV. L.
REV. 1823, 1828 (2014) [hereinafter Employment Law] (“Court opinions championing the
‘transcendent value’ of academic freedom have emphasized in dicta the peculiar value of
new ideas in the unique context of classrooms and intellectual scholarship. However,
such a justification is lacking for Demers’s administrative pamphlet, which was speech
typical of employees in a variety of employment relationships outside the university
setting.” (footnotes omitted)).
275 See Demers, 746 F.3d at 413 (“For reasons best known to himself, Demers did
not put the draft introduction or any of the draft chapters of Ivory Tower into the record.”).
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the university to help implement the plan,276 which might be
taken to support his offering the Plan as a citizen rather than as
an employee.277 As was true in Adams, there were legitimate
reasons in Demers for the university to take the actions that
were allegedly retaliatory.278 A separate issue was whether there
in fact had been retaliation against him, which would be
determined on remand.279
Both the Adams and Demers courts recognized the
importance of protecting both scholarship and teaching as a
matter of academic freedom, which is unsurprising because both
of those activities involve the “communication of ideas.”280
Further, it is of course true that one’s teaching might inform
one’s scholarship281 and one’s scholarship can inform one’s
teaching.282 Levin v. Harleston283 illustrates a different way in
which teaching and scholarship might be related. Michael Levin
had published “writings contain[ing] a number of denigrating
comments concerning the intelligence and social characteristics
of blacks . . . .”284 Students protested Levin’s views and disrupted
his classes.285 Thus, Levin’s research might have been related to
his teaching in that students knowing of his views might not
have felt comfortable in this class.
There was no record of any student complaining of unfair
treatment by Levin on the basis of race.286 Nonetheless, perhaps
fearing that some students would not feel comfortable having
Levin as a teacher, the Dean of Humanities created an alternate
276 See id. at 407.
277 But see Employment Law, supra note 274, at 1825 (“Despite Demers’s claim
that the Plan was prepared through Marquette Books LLC and not the university, the
panel determined that his actions fit sufficiently within the ‘pursuant to [his] official
duties’ standard articulated in Garcetti.” (quoting Demers, 746 F.3d at 419)).
278 Demers, 746 F.3d. at 409 (“Defendants contend that the legitimate reasons
for Demers’s critical annual reviews include his post-tenure failure to publish
scholarship in refereed journals, his failure to perform his appropriate share of
university service, and his failure to report properly his activities at Marquette Books.”).
279 See id. at 417–18 (“Should the district court determine that Demers’s First
Amendment rights were violated, it may still grant injunctive relief to the degree it is
appropriate.”).
280 Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 245 (1957).
281 Peter A. Joy, Clinical Scholarship: Improving the Practice of Law, 2
CLINICAL L. REV. 385, 394 (1996) (“[T]he teaching informs the scholarship as when
clinicians write about the insights gained through engaging in reflective practice with
clinical law students.”).
282 Gerald Torres, Law and the Creation of Meaning: A Brief Reflection on the
Work of Jane Larson, Preface, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 105, 109 (2013) (“[O]ne of
the benefits of good scholarship is that it informs teaching by making insights deeper.”).
283 Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
284 Id. at 87.
285 Id. at 90 (discussing the university’s “alleged failure to take steps to prevent what
they themselves describe as ‘undisputed facts concerning disruptions’ of Levin’s classes”).
286 Id. at 88.
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section so that Levin’s students could transfer to it if they so
desired.287 The district court found that the shadow classes had
been created to stigmatize the professor’s writings and ordered
their discontinuation.288 The Second Circuit affirmed,289 noting,
however, that the creation of shadow courses would have been
permitted had there been a legitimate reason for them
outweighing the implicated rights to academic freedom.290
It is precisely this kind of case (i.e., one in which a
professor’s scholarship involves very controversial views) that
makes academic freedom precarious under a Pickering analysis.
Suppose that the college feared a loss of funding.291 Would
Pickering have allowed Levin to be fired? Even were funding
issues not presented, Levin’s classes were picketed, which of
course affected workplace efficiency. Under a Pickering
balancing test, such a professor might well not be protected by
the First Amendment if suspended or fired for his published
writings. The Second Circuit did not use a balancing test,
instead suggesting that punishing Levin for his speech outside
the classroom would violate First Amendment guarantees.292
CONCLUSION
Commentators are correct to suggest that the Garcetti
exception to Pickering might be read to endanger academic
freedom as it is commonly understood.293 Yet, even if theGarcetti
287 Id. at 87–88 (“Dean Sherwin created an ‘alternative’ section of Philosophy 101
for those of Levin’s students who might want to transfer out of his class. He wrote to the
students inLevin’s class onFebruary 1, after the semester had commencedandwithout notice
to Levin, informing them of the alternative section to which they could transfer.”).
288 Id. at 88 (“The district court found that the shadow classes ‘were established
with the intent and consequence of stigmatizing Professor Levin solely because of his
expression of ideas,’ . . . and enjoined their continuance.”).
289 Id.
290 Id. (“Formation of the alternative sections would not be unlawful if done to
further a legitimate educational interest that outweighed the infringement on Professor
Levin’s First Amendment rights.”).
291 Cf. supra notes 230–237 and accompanying text (discussing Dube).
292 Levin, 966 F.2d at 90 (“[T]he commencement, or threat thereof, of
disciplinary proceedings against Professor Levin predicated solely upon his protected
speech outside the classroom violates his First Amendment rights.”).
293 J. Peter Byrne, Neo-Orthodoxy in Academic Freedom, 88 TEX. L. REV. 143,
169 (2009) (reviewing MATTHEWW. FINKIN&ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMONGOOD:
PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM (2009)) (“The looming question posed by
Garcetti of the relation between our tradition of academic freedom and the First
Amendment makes the need to address these issues acute.”); Alan K. Chen, Bureaucracy
and Distrust: Germaneness and the Paradoxes of the Academic Freedom Doctrine, 77 U.
COLO. L. REV. 955, 959 n.16 (2006) (“In Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006),
the Court held that when public employees speak in the course of fulfilling their official
duties, they are not speaking as citizens within the meaning of the First Amendment.
This statement would appear to undermine any future claim for individual academic
freedom.”); Elizabeth M. Ellis, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Public Employees Left to Decide
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exception does not apply to teachers in their teaching and research,
the Court must still make clear the conditions under which rights
to academic freedom may be overridden. If the Pickering analysis
is used to make that determination, then academic freedomwill be
much weaker than is commonly thought.
The Court has offered insufficient guidance on whether
Garcetti applies in the academic setting, much less on whether a
distinction should bemade between primary and secondary schools
on the one hand and colleges and universities on the other. Even in
those areaswhereGarcetti is inapplicable, it is unclearwhether the
right to academic freedom enjoyed by state employees should be
analyzed under Pickering or some other test. Insofar as Pickering
is applicable, the Court has been utterly unhelpful with respect to
how the workplace efficiency factor should be applied in the
academic setting. Unless properly cabined, such a factor could
severely diminish academic freedom rights.
The Court’s failure to explain how Garcetti and Pickering
are to be applied in the academic context has led to very different
analyses in the circuits, which means that an instructor
punished for her speech might be protected by the First
Amendment in one circuit but not in another. The Court must
clarify this area at its first opportunity to protect academic
freedom and the expansion of knowledge.
“Your Conscience or Your Job”, 41 IND. L. REV. 187, 212 n.172 (2008) (“[A]ny suggestion
that ‘matters of public concern’ may not encompass job-related expression of professors
would undermine the special protections the Court has given academic freedom for the
past 50 years.”); Fackrell, supra note 272, at 544 (“Garcetti’s threshold official duties
inquiry suppresses academic freedom by categorically barring research, scholarship, and
teaching from First Amendment protection because these duties stand at the core of
university professors and faculty. This categorical exclusion undermines the essence of
academic freedom by granting unfettered power to the institution.”); Oren R. Griffin,
Academic Freedom and Professorial Speech in the Post-GarcettiWorld, 37 SEATTLEU. L.
REV. 1, 7 (2013) (“[A] conflict may exist as to whether Garcetti’s application undermines
academic freedom at colleges and universities.”); Richard E. Levy, The Tweet Hereafter:
Social Media and the Free Speech Rights of Kansas Public University Employees, 24 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 78, 95 (2014) (“[T]he Court in Garcetti left open the possibility that
Pickeringmay still apply to speech pursuant to official duties if that speech is within the
scope of academic freedom. Garcetti’s ambiguous treatment of this issue highlights the
uncertain relationship between academic freedom and the First Amendment.”). Carol N.
Tran,Recognizing an Academic FreedomException to theGarcetti Limitation on the First
Amendment Right to Free Speech, 45 AKRON L. REV. 949, 951–52 (2012) (“The leading
case on the First Amendment and free speech in the workplace is Garcetti v. Ceballos, in
which the United States Supreme Court held that governmental employees who speak
out pursuant to job responsibilities are not protected by the First Amendment from
employer discipline for that speech. While the United States Supreme Court has stated
in dicta that an academic freedom exception to this limit may exist, the Court has not
yet provided any guidance for this hypothetical exception.”).
